

Misinformation in the Red Sea

Investigating Concurrent Failures

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Submarine Cable Engineer

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
Agenda

1. The Red Sea & Subsea Cables
2. 24th February
3. Which, Where and When – The Truth?
4. Summary of events
5. Causes

01 The Red Sea & Subsea Cables


International Capacity Reliance

Europe / Middle East / Asia Subsea Capacity is
reliant on the Red Sea




International Capacity Reliance

12 In-Service Submarine Cables Traverse the Red Sea




International Capacity Reliance

At least five planned systems.




‘Gate of Grief’

20km wide Bab-el Mandeb Strait squeezes all cables to a corridor <12km.



6th March 2024

3/6/2024: True Confidence



Houthi Threat?

December 26, 2023



The following report is now a complimentary offering from MEMRI's Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor (JTTM). For JTTM subscription information, [click here](#).

On December 24, 2023, a Telegram channel affiliated with Yemen's Iran-backed Ansar Allah Movement (the Houthis) shared^[1] a map of networks of submarine communications cables in the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, and the Persian Gulf. The map was accompanied by an implied threat: "There are maps of international cables connecting all regions of the world through the sea. It seems that Yemen is in a strategic location, as internet lines that connect entire continents – not only countries – pass near it."



Houthi Threat?

Republic of Yemen
Ministry of Telecommunications
and Information Technology



الجمهورية اليمنية
وزارة الاتصالات وتكنولوجيا المعلومات

Date: 26.12.2023

المراجع:

المرفق: 13.6.14459

التاريخ:

Press Release Issued by the Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Technology – Republic of Yemen, on the Submarine Cables

The Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Technology (MTIT) disclaims what has been published by the social media and other media, particularly those related to the Zionist enemy, with regard to the so-called threats against the Submarine Cables that cross Bab al-Mandeb in the Red Sea-Yemen.

The approach of the Government of Yemen (GoY), through the MTIT, is to focus on building and developing the telecom and Internet services, and expanding the range of services through the licensed telecom institutions and companies. The MTIT endeavors to overcome challenges and difficulties and move on to the modern technology and new generations of telecom and Internet services. The MTIT continues its development steps toward the digital transformation, contributing to the advancement of all aspects of the individuals and the society in Yemen at large.

The MTIT works based on its national vision and strategy and continues - currently and in the future - to build regional and international partnerships, through the Yemeni Telecom's contribution to the development of its mutual interest with its partners, including projects on the Submarine Cables, regional data centers, which contribute to preserve the Yemeni rights and sovereignty. The Yemeni Telecom confirms its pivotal role in continuously building and developing the telecom and Internet network systems, at the regional & international levels, which are provided via the Submarine Cables that pass through the territorial waters of Yemen. The MTIT continues its endeavors to facilitate and implement projects on the Submarine Cables in the territorial waters of Yemen, including those projects that the Republic of Yemen has contributed through the Yemen International Telecommunications Company (TeleYemen).

The Yemeni Telecom emphasizes that it is keen to keep the telecom submarine cables away from any possible risks and the decision by Yemen in Sana'a to ban the passage of any ships belonging to the Israeli enemy does not pertain to the ships of those corporations licensed by the Government of Yemen to execute the submarine works of submarine cables.

The MTIT emphasizes as well that all ships which are executing the works of the submarine cables must obtain the necessary permits and approvals from the Yemeni Marine Affairs Authority- Sana'a.

Issued by the Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Technology
The Republic of Yemen
Sana'a
Tuesday, 26 December, 2023





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شعار الوزارة

9:45 GMT

24th February 2024 at 14:45 UTC 41 UTC

Fishing Djibouti
1039km from BU KSA

Terrorist
10:45 UTC

09:50 UTC

10:45 LT
AAE-1 confirmed 2135km from zafarana

Houthi Hit Underwater Communications Cables

By Assaf Gilead, Globes
February 26, 2024

"Globes" has learned that four submarine communications cables have been damaged in the Red Sea between Jeddah in Saudi Arabia and Djibouti in East Africa.



1039km from BU Saudi Arabia

Houthi

Seismic
14:45 LT

Crisis

SMW5

Other Vessels

Anchor

10:45 LT

09:50 UTC

Coincidence

Volcano

14:45 LT

Misinformation Perpetuation

3 submarine cables cut in the Red Sea between Jeddah and Djibouti. AAE-1, EIG and SEACOM/TGN-Eurasia are down. Note: Authorities looking at potential terror link.

and 44 others

6 comments • 10 reposts

At least one subsea fiber cable damaged in the Red Sea, some reports blame Houthi rebels

Israeli press say AAE-1, Seacom/TGN, and Europe India Gateway (EIG) damaged by rebels; Seacom confirms issues but not cause


February 26, 2024 By: Dan Swinhoe Have your say

Several subsea cables have reportedly been damaged off the coast of Yemen, with some press suggesting terrorist groups are to blame.

One cable operator has confirmed damage to a cable in the region, but said it didn't know the cause yet.

Israeli press including the [Jerusalem Post](#) and [Globes](#) suggest four cables - AAE-1, Seacom, Europe India Gateway (EIG), and TGN systems - have been damaged in the Red Sea off the coast of Yemen (though Seacom and TGN are actually one system operated by Seacom and Tata Communications).

The publications claim the damage to the cables was a result of attacks by Yemen's Iranian-backed Houthi rebels. Globes reports repairs could take up to eight weeks.



Houthis Hit Underwater Communications Cables

By Assaf Gilead, Globes
February 26, 2024

“Globes” has learned that four submarine communications cables have been damaged in the Red Sea between Jeddah in Saudi Arabia and Djibouti in East Africa.

Three months after the Houthis began attacking merchant ships, the Yemenite rebels have carried out another one of their threats. “Globes” has learned that four submarine communication cables have been damaged in the Red Sea between Jeddah in Saudi Arabia and Djibouti in East Africa.

According to the reports, these are cables from the companies AAE-1, [Seacom](#), EIG and TGN. This is causing serious disruption of Internet communications between Europe and Asia, with the main damage being felt in the Gulf countries and India.

Estimates are that the damage to communications activities is significant but not critical because other cables pass through the same region linking Asia, Africa and Europe that have not been hit. The repair of such a large number of underwater cables may take at least eight weeks according to estimates and involve exposure to risk from the Houthi terror organization. The telecommunications companies will be forced to look for companies that will agree to carry out the repair work and probably pay them a high risk premium.




03 Which, When & Where?

Which systems
actually failed?

Where are the fault
locations?


When specifically
were the faults?



Which systems actually failed?

AAE-1, SEACOM and EIG confirmed (SEACOM and TGN are the same).

MENA & FALCON confirmed live.




Which systems actually failed?

AAE-1, SEACOM and EIG confirmed (SEACOM and TGN are the same).

MENA & FALCON confirmed live internally.

EASSy confirmed live with owner.

SMW3, SMW4, SMW5 and IMW confirmed live with owner.




Where are the fault locations?


Direct analysis of OTDR data allowed fault location data to be refined.



**When specifically
were the faults?**




**When specifically
were the faults?**



When specifically
were the faults?

XX



04 Causes



Vessel (Anchor,
Dredging or Fishing)

Statistical Likelihood: 58%



Intrinsic Failure

Statistical Likelihood: 10.5%



Geohazard / Natural
Feature

Statistical Likelihood: 4.8%




Hostile Act

Statistical Likelihood: Unknown



Geohazard / Natural Feature?

- Seismicity Records
- Survey Data
- Fault Timing
- Desktop Study





Vessel (Anchor,
Dredging or Fishing)

Statistical Likelihood: 58%



Intrinsic Failure

Statistical Likelihood: 10.5%



Geohazard / Natural
Feature

Statistical Likelihood: 4.8%



Hostile Act

Statistical Likelihood: Unknown




Vessel?

Fishing Activity?

Anchoring?

Unusual Activity?




04 Causes

Vessel?

Fishing Activity?

Anchoring?

Unusual Activity?



13.324137, 42.983619

What kind of ship is this?

SUEZ ENCHANTED (IMO: 9318084) is a **Crude Oil Tanker** and is sailing under the flag of **Liberia**. Her length overall (LOA) is 274 meters and her width is 48.04 meters.

Lat: 13.282934, Lng: 43.010001

174 m 0.00 km²


What kind of ship is this?

PS PELICAN (IMO: 9316593) is a **Oil/Chemical Tanker** and is sailing under the flag of **Panama**. Her length overall (LOA) is 175.96 meters and her width is 31 meters.

Vessel?

- No AIS transmission
- Not underway (no wake)
- Inconsistent with TSS navigation
- Close proximity to failed cables (<5km)





Rubymar

Dimensions are consistent

Wheelhouse configuration is consistent.

Deck colouring consistent.

Northward drift consistent with known wind and ocean currents since abandonment.

Photographic confirmation that anchor was deployed (fault mechanism).



Rubymar summary



