


How the Internet routed around Cable Damage in the Baltic Sea

Internet event analysis with RIPE Atlas

RIPE Labs







RouterLab



Traditionally, computer network courses focus on introducing. students to the venture concepts of the internet's architecture and its protectly. While such courses equip students with a theoretical foundation on how the internet works, they often full to cover the gnattical and operational aspects is...







Low-Latency Hardware-Assisted Virtual Networking

Rose Wester - Jr No. 2021 - historian

Witaksation can help optimise resource sharing, providing improved support for time latency applications when compared to bare-metal systems. But achieving ultra-low latency on costeffective furdisory requires strategic planning

med teach resources



Latest Podcasts



Emile Aben: How the Internet Routed Around Damage in the Baltic Sea

90

Julian, Pertugal 12: 16:May 2015

The RIPE Labs Article Competition - RIPE 90

The RIPE Labs article competition is back again more something.

inversiting to say about the past, present, or future state of the

bloomen! Self-your story on holfd Labs and eith a chance to poin us

Alun Daves ST MAY 2000 I not inset

at RIPE 90 this May in Lisbox, Portugal.

Antonella De Bellix - pr mu-2020 - 9 con resel Dur experience design is not about trends, it's alloud polying real problems. The team behind the BIPEstat. talk in disjoin about the design journey they undertook to create the latest iteration of the U.

Unlocking UX: A User-Centred Journey for RIPEstat


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Francesca Bosco: Who Governs Cyberspace?

Anastativa Pate





Timeframe

Sort by

Emile Aben: How the Internet Routed Around Damage in the Baltic Sea

Alun Oavies + 31 Mar 2025 + 2 min road

When two Internet cables in the Baltic Sea were reported as broken last November, we turned to RIPE Atlas to examine the damage. In this episode, Emile Aben discusses what his analysis uncovered about the impact of

these and similar incidents, and how the internet remained resil

atlas podcast outages measurements



Read more on RIPE Labs:

RIPE Labs



Emile Aben

105

886

Articles Likes on articles



About the author

Manage Profile

Based in Amsterdam, NL

I'm a data scientist at the RIPE NCC. I'm a chemist by training, but have been working since 1998 on Internet related things, as a sysadmin, security consultant, web developer and researcher. I am interested in technology changes (like IPv6 deployment), Internet measurement, data analysis, data visualisation, sustainability and security. I'd like to bring research and operations closer together, ie. do research that is operationally relevant. When I'm not working I like to make music (electric guitar, bass and drums), do sports (swimming, (inline) skating, bouldering, soccer), and try to be a good parent.

Links & Social










Articles 105 Contributions 64 Comments 18

Newest







Emile Aben + 19 Dec 2024 + 25 min read

With last month's cuts in two major Baltic Sea Internet cables now successfully repaired, and another cut having occurred in the meantime, we analyse these events and delve deeper into the question of how

Baltic Sea cable damage



Partial timeline (focus on initial events we analysed)

17 Nov 2024: BCS East-West outage

18 Nov 2024: C-LION1 outage

27 Nov 2024: BCS East-West restored

28 Nov 2024: C-LION1 restored

25 Dec 2024: C-LION1 outage

06 Jan 2025: C-LION1 restored

26 Jan 2025: LVRTC outage


28 Feb 2025: LVRTC restored



Baltic Sea cable damage




Media coverage



Baltic Sea cable damage





Measuring damage with RIPE Atlas




RIPE Atlas

A global network of probes measuring the Internet in real time

13,400+ probes connected

800+ anchors deployed

35,000+ daily measurements on average (both user-defined and built-in)



Measuring damage with RIPE Atlas



Anchor mesh

RIPE Atlas anchors support ping, traceroute, DNS, HTTP/S measurements

Each anchor performs ongoing ping measurements to all other anchors at four-minute intervals

Resulting 'mesh' of measurements lets us observe latency changes and packet loss between anchors




First look

17-18 November

BCS East-West: Sweden-Lithuania

C-LION1: Germany-Finland

We looked at results in the RIPE Atlas anchor mesh between these countries around reported time of the event




Latency shift

View of paths between anchors in Sweden and Lithuania, 12 hours before/after time of event

Latency increase of approx 10-20 ms shortly before 08:00 UTC on 17 November

*We subtract the minimum latency for a path during our observation period to make the latency jumps comparable




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


Latency shift

View of paths between anchors in Germany and Finland, 12 hours before/after time of event

Latency increase of approx 5ms a little after 02:00 UTC on 18 November

*We subtract the minimum latency for a path during our observation period to make the latency jumps comparable





Packet loss

Baseline of 0% packet loss (with occasional spikes)



No significant increase in packet loss at time of the cable outage (shortly before 08:00 UTC)

C-LION1




Latency shift

View of paths between anchors in Germany and Finland, 12 hours before/after time of event

Latency increase of approx 5ms a little after 02:00 UTC on 18 November

Again: no significant increase in packet loss



C-LION1




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
Again: no significant increase in packet loss



C-LION1 repair

28 November (17:30 UTC): C-Lion1 cable repair ship reported leaving the area after successful repair

Unclear exactly what caused these latency effects and the temporary increase in packet loss...




Beyond the Baltic: ES-PT Power Outage April 2025



Anchor mesh measurements potential for getting insights into outages

Power outage events much harder to measure compared to cable outage events

Due to the infrastructure being brought offline by the event itself



Summing up

There was a relatively minor but visible shift in latency for around 20-30% of paths between observed anchors

But there was no concurrent increase in packet loss



Summing up

There was a relatively minor but visible shift in latency for around 20-30% of paths between observed anchors

But there was no concurrent increase in packet loss

The Internet routed around damage!




Deeper dive



Initial analysis was based on ping (endto-end latency) data

We followed this up with in depth analysis using traceroute data

Aim: to examine how the paths actually changed while end-to-end connectivity was maintained



Levels of resilience



Inter-domain rerouting:


Traffic rerouted through alternative ASes/IXPs (eBGP routing protocol)

Intra-domain rerouting:

Rerouting *within* networks over alternative paths (IGP: OSPF, IS-IS)

Circuit-level rerouting:

Rerouting along alternative circuitlevel connections between routers (same IP address!)




Resilience is not guaranteed: Côte d'Ivoire, 2024



Cable damage in Africa

14 March 2024: Submarine landslide off coast of Cote d'Ivoire resulted in damage across multiple cables:

- ACE: Africa Coast to Europe
- MainOne
- SAT-3: Submarine Atlantic 3/West Africa Submarine Cable
- WACS: West Africa Cable System




Resilience is not guaranteed: Côte d'Ivoire, 2024



Latency shift with packet loss

View of paths between anchors in UK and South Africa.

Latency increases of approx 20-30 ms accompanied by concurrent increase in packet loss



Resilience is not guaranteed: Red Sea, 2025



Cable damage in the Red Sea

5 September 2025: Reports emerge of cable outages in the Red Sea affecting:

- FALCON
- SeaMeWe-4
- IMEWE
- Europe IndiaGateway (EIG)




Resilience is not guaranteed: Red Sea, 2025



Latency shift with packet loss

View of paths between anchors in France and India.

Latency increases of approx 100 ms accompanied by concurrent increase in packet loss




Resilience is not guaranteed: Red Sea, 2025



Packet loss

Up to 50% increase in packet loss



Significant increase (up to 50%) in packet loss at time of the initial cable outage followed by ongoing loss over next 24 hours.

Note: the right hand y-axis (associated with the black line indicating packet loss) is of a higher scale here compared to previous plots: 0-150 ms

Conclusions



In the Baltic Sea:

- "The Internet routed around damage"
- Internet resilience depends on multiple levels of redundancy
 - Redundancy between networks
 - Redundancy within networks (circuit and routing)

Conclusions



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But resilience is not guaranteed

Conclusions



In the Baltic Sea:

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
But resilience is not guaranteed

We have to keep monitoring, measuring, understanding














Country code	Nr of anchor	Nr of cities	Nr of ASNs	landings	Cables wit	Cable Count	List of citie	List of AS
AR	4	4	4	3	firmina malb	7	bhi bue ttd v	28109 42
AW	0	0	0	2	celia alonso	3		
BZ	0	0	0	3	arcos	1		
BO	0	0	0	0		0		
BR	14	9	14	63	norte-cone	18	bhz cci cpv	10417 61
CL	7	2	6	19	halaihai sou	6	ccp scl	64112 20
CO	2	1	2	10	tam-1 mant	12	bog	12008 27
CR	1	1	1	2	tam-1 arco	5	fil	273147
CU	0	0	0	7	arimao gtm	4		
DO	4	4	4	5	antillas-1 ar	6	lav mca ssu	273867 2
EC	1	1	1	7.	carnival-su	4	uio	61468
SV	0	0	0	0		0		
FK	0	0	0	0		0		
GF	0	0	0	2	deep-blue	4		
GT	1	1	1	2	tam-1 tikal	6	gua	273149
GY	0	0	0	1	deep-blue	3		
HT	0	0	0	2	bahamas-d	2		
HN	1	1	1	3	tam-1 arco	3	sap	64150
MX	5	4	4	13	carnival-su	11	hmo mex qr	4493 424
AN	0	0	0	0		0		
NI	0	0	0	2	arcos	1		
PA	1	1	1	7.	tam-1 mant	9	pty	272037
PY	1	1	1	0		0	vir	266858
PE	2	2	2	3	south-pacif	3	aqp lim	263189 6
GS	0	0	0	0		0		
SR	0	0	0	2	deep-blue	2		
TT	1	1	1	4	deep-blue	6	ptw	264811
UY	2	1	2	2	firmina tann	4	mvd	28000 605
VE	0	0	0	0		0		

































Questions & Comments







THANK YOU!